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GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE
HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION
Russell K Osgoodt
Most lawyers and commentators assume that judges can and
should consistently ascertain and apply constitutional law doctrine.'
Thus, the primary epithet aimed at a purportedly erroneous judicial
decision or commentary is that it is "unprincipled." 2 What this
means is that the decision or commentary represents doctrinal in-
constancy or incoherence or, at a minimum, diverges from the posi-
tion supported by the critic hurling the epithet.
The assumption that a stable datum of "doctrine" exists which
courts can apply to constitutional problems conflicts with most indi-
viduals' perception of the current state of United States constitu-
tional law. 3 It also conflicts, to some extent, with older notions of
the judicial function. For example, Felix Frankfurter and others4
have argued that in many situations courts should refuse to rule,
withhold a ruling, or avoid a ruling by using a prudential tactic like
abstention or the political question doctrine.5 Despite the failure of
doctrinal coherence or "principledness" 6 to eventuate and its incon-
sistency with Frankfurtian prudential notions, only a few have ques-
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. The author thanks students and faculty of
law and history at the University of Glasgow, the University of Edinburgh, and Cornell
University for reading (or listening to) and commenting upon earlier versions of this
article, including Gregory Alexander, William Gordon, James Henderson, Chris Him-
sworth, Dennis Hutchinson, Sheri Johnson, Robert Kent, and Dale Oesterle.
I One notable exception is Phillip Bobbitt's view expressed in his book, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FATE (1982).
2 See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971);
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Pinciples, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978);
Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
When confronted with a difficult array of precedentJudge Bork has softened his position
to some extent. See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1395-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(upholding a U.S. Navy regulation requiring that homosexual sailors be discharged on
ground that Court cannot create a constitutional right to engage in homosexual activity
despite line of cases purporting to recognize privacy rights.).
3 See, e.g., Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
4 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 127-43 (2d ed. 1986).
5 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Brennan, J.) (curtailing political
question doctrine); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (Frankfurter,
J.) (classic abstention case).
6 T1his essay also uses the term "doctrinality" to refer to principledness.
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tioned this underlying assumption. 7
Surely the most famous argument for principledness is Herbert
Wechsler's 1959 forward to the Harvard Law Review.8 It is an ele-
gant, deeply thoughtful, and erudite lecture. Like many lectures, it
glosses over major problems, but scholars continue to debate its
claims with respect. Wechsler defined a principled decision as "one
that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, rea-
sons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any im-
mediate result that is involved." 9 He then used this theory of
principledness to criticize the holdings in Shelley v. Kraemer'0 and
Brown v. Board of Education 1" and its progeny. Wechsler began his
lecture with an attack on Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter for
endorsing prudential notions in judicial decision making.' 2 Wechs-
ler believed that the courts must decide each case presented unless
the Constitution unequivocally commits the question to another
branch.' 3 He argued that courts should decide cases on the basis of
neutral 14 or general principles-principles not generated in political
debate for political ends. At one point in the lecture Wechsler con-
ceded, "When no sufficient... [principled reasons] can be assigned
for overturning value choices of the other branches of the Govern-
ment, or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive."' 5
Although Wechsler neither emphasized this nor illustrated it with
examples, he wrote later that articulating the amount of burden a
state may impose on interstate commerce may be "beyond the pos-
sibility of principled decision."' 6
7 But see infra text accompanying notes 28-31.
8 Wechsler, supra note 2. For criticism and some support of Wechsler, see Greena-
walt, supra note 2; Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27
U. CH. L. REV. 661 (1960); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of ltepretiv-
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1981).
9 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 19.
10 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
'1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 1-10.
13 Id. at 9-10. Impeachment is one example of such a commitment. Id. at 7; see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3.
14 It is interesting to speculate why Wechsler chose the word "neutral." Many
things which might be labelled constitutional principles, like racial equality, are not neu-
tral in any sense of the term. That Wechsler meant to exclude current political consider-
ations is clear. Perhaps he chose the word to avoid being trapped by a word like
"textual." Kent Greenawalt has the best discussion of the meaning of Wechsler's "neu-
tral," but after reading Greenawalt's discussion, it is still not clear to me that the word
"neutral" adds much to the meaning of the word "general." See Greenawalt, supra note
2, at 985 ("A person gives a neutral reason, in Wechsler's sense, if he states a basis for a
decision that he would be willing to follow in other situations to which it applies.").
5 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 19.
I (1 Wechsler, The Nature ofJudicial Reasoning, in 1L-w AND Piiii.osoii' 290, 299 (S.
Hook ed. 1964) (emphasizing difficulty of using neutral principles in nebulous legal ar-
eas such as scope of permissible state action tinder commerce clause): se' also H. %'1-(:I1S-
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Two prominent constitutional law commentators, Robert Nagel
and Jesse Choper, have offered modifications on the notion of
principledness without deserting its central features. Nagel attacks
the recent trend in constitutional decisions to spawn and present
doctrine in formulaic terms, such as tests with "prongs," "stan-
dards," or "hurdles."' 7 Nagel argues that such formulations inevita-
bly distance judges from the text of the Constitution, and even
worse, they fail to communicate effectively with the public, the wider
audience for Supreme Court decisions.' 8
Nagel does not, however, attack the notion that doctrine can be
elaborated. At most his article implies that courts have difficulty ar-
ticulating constitutional doctrine apart from constitutional text, and
that many efforts to do so fail. Nagel suggests that lean, law-apply-
ingjudicial decisions should be the norm,' 9 but he does not indicate
how judges can fashion such decisions from broad constitutional
language without some doctrinal elaboration.
Ironically, Nagel's distrust of complex doctrinal tests allies him
with liberal commentators who have decried the dilution of certain
constitutional guarantees through the mechanism of balancing cal-
culi. In the most remarkable of these developments, the Court, it is
said, 20 has balanced away the right not to have one's home or per-
son searched without a warrant procured upon a showing of prob-
able cause in the context of grand jury proceedings2 1 and, more
recently, when a police officer acts in good faith in procuring a war-
rant which is later found defective in some respect.22
Jesse Choper also proposes a modified version of principled-
ness. In two articles23 which compose the core of his book Judicial
Review and the National Political Process24 Choper argues that the fed-
LER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LA\v 35-36 (1961) (using Holmes' clear
and present danger test as example of a neutral principle).
17 Nagel, supra note 3, at 165.
18 In a short "speculation" at the end of his article, Nagel attributes the formulaic
trend to a vision of constitutional jurisprudence in which the Supreme Court sees itself
as locked in combat with popular culture. Id. at 211-12. Thus, the Court's formulae
may represent judicial imperialism in the form of adoption of anti-democratic con-
straints and indicate that the Court no longer considers it necessary or desirable to com-
municate with the public.
19 Id.
20 LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and
Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895.
21 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
22 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
2 3 Choper, The Scope of National Power l'is-d-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial
Review. 86 YALE I.J. 1552 (1977) [hereinafter Choper, Judicial Review]; Choper, The
Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice. 122 U. PA. L. RE'.
810 (1974) 1hereinafter Choper, Theory and Practice].
24 .. CioI'ER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND TIE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
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eral courts should husband their limited, institutional capital, ex-
pending it for the most part on individual rights cases. Thus, "the
federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respect-
ing the ultimate power of the national government vis-a-vis the
states." 25 Choper justifies avoiding federalism cases on the basis
that the issues in such cases are qualitatively different than those
considered in individual rights cases. The latter involve "princi-
ple," 2 6 whereas the former concern only the question of which en-
tity may do something, rather than whether that thing may be done
at all. Choper ends the first of his two articles by stating the as-
sumption underlying his argument, namely, that the "central func-
tion" of judicial review is to "[curb] majoritarian abuse of the
constitutional liberties of the individual." 27
There have been two major, but isolated, attacks on the notion
of principledness. In his book Constitutional Fate, Phillip Bobbitt sug-
gests that some Supreme Court decisions are best viewed as the ex-
ercise of an "expressive function" in constitutional jurisprudence.
These decisions, according to Bobbitt, tend not to have a clear doc-
trinal or textual basis and tend not to become significant prece-
dent.28 At a deeper level, the exercise of this expressive function
represents the social order's continuing effort to create its own
"fate."29
Mark Tushnet has also attacked the notion of principledness
from a quasi-Marxist, semiotic perspective. 30 Actually, most of
Tushnet's attack is aimed at Wechsler's claim that doctrine can, and
should, be elaborated in terms of "neutral" principles. Tushnet ar-
gues, "Interpretivism and neutral principles, as the two leading dog-
mas of modern constitutional theory, are thus designed to remedy a
central problem of liberal theory by constraining the judiciary suffi-
ciently to prevent judicial tyranny."3 1
Despite these criticisms, the assumption of principledness, or
"doctrinality," remains so universal that it deserves careful recon-
sideration, especially in light of several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. This essay attempts such an analysis in the context of three
such decisions. Bowsher v. Synar,32 the most recent case and the one
25 Choper,Judicial Review. supra note 23, at 1557.
26 Id. at 1555-56.
27 Id. at 1579; see also Choper, Theory and Practice, supra note 23, at 858 (essential role
of judicial review in our society is to guard against certain constitutional transgressions
specifically sought to be imposed by popular majorities).
28 P. BoBarrr, supra note 1, at 196-219.
29 Id. at 233-40.
"30 Tushnet. supra note 8.
I Id. at 784-85.
32 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
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of primary importance in this essay, involved separation of powers
within the federal system. The second case, Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 3 3 concerned the allocation ofjudicial responsi-
bility within the federal system, and the third, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,34 considered federalism in the com-
merce clause context.
An observer of the United States Supreme Court will immedi-
ately recognize that Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Garcia were very complex
cases, each of which came to the Court with a long pedigree of prior,
relevant decisions and commentary. As a result, it was difficult for
the Court in each case to articulate a principled statement of doc-
trine. The factual and doctrinal complexity of these cases might
suggest that they are not good examples on which to focus in con-
sidering the validity of the assumption of doctrinality. The propo-
nents of principledness have, however, argued for its application in
contexts of similar complexity and constitutional importance. For
example, Robert Bork has purported to apply the doctrine in first
amendment 35 and privacy 36 cases. More importantly, it is appropri-
ate to scrutinize the assumption of doctrinality in the context of the
more difficult and fundamental questions of constitutional law be-
cause it is in this context that doctrinality is allegedly the most
helpful.
The notion that courts can and should articulate doctrine so
that it produces discrete portions of truth which, when fitted to-
gether like a puzzle, display the constitutional law of the United
States is difficult to test. On the one hand, if a particular decision,
like Bowsher, is labelled incoherent, then the proponents of
principledness argue that the problem is with the decision, the com-
mentator evaluating the decision, or both. On the other hand, if
one starts with a single statement of doctrinal principle, for instance
Bork's theory of the core meaning of the first amendment, 37 and
applies it to a particular case, the application rarely confronts the
mass of available precedent or other data. The inherent difficulty in
testing doctrinality may be the reason that it has lived such a long
33 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
34 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
35 See, e.g., Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J.,) (striking down WMT1A's rejection of a poster based on its political con-
tent); see also Bork, supra note 2 (discussing Wechsler's concept of "neutral principles" in
the context of the first amendment).
36 See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding Navy
regulation requiring discharge of homosexual sailors despite argument that it violated
privacy interest).
37 Bork, supra note 2, at 29. ("[The core of the first amendment [is] speech that is
explicitly political.").
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and unqualified life in the minds of many lawyers, but it is not a
reason not to continue the intellectual testing.
This essay will analyze Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Garcia to test the
validity of the claim that constitutional law can usually be articulated
in terms of enduring doctrinal formulations. The case law on sepa-
ration of powers and federalism, analyzed here, refutes this claim.
Instead, the Constitution provides an historical framework38 which
throws the three branches of the federal government and the vari-
ous components of the federal system into a perpetual state of pos-
sible competition and confrontation. 39 In this framework the
underlying social order generates over time the answers as well as
the constitutional questions.
My argument, that historical context4° is a significant and
changeable determinant in constitutional decision making, further
justifies focusing on these three cases in a symposium about Bowsher:
Other constitutional and structural developments in the federal sys-
tem provide an important part of the historical context for Bowsher.
Thus, both Pennhurst and Garcia are directly relevant to a deeper un-
derstanding of Bowsher.
This essay will discuss each case first in doctrinal terms and sec-
ondly in terms of some tentative historical perspectives. Next, the
essay will develop the theory of an historical constitution. The essay
will end with an analysis of the three cases in terms of that theory.
38 I am not arguing that all legal decisions are existentialist acts or that law is radi-
cally indeterminate. Nor am I even saying that law is likely to be used as an instrument in
a Marxist class struggle. I am saying that articulations of law are always and necessarily
incomplete and tentative. Because of the nature of human society and behavior and
other historical variables, for each final exposition of any constitutional provision there
will always arise new questions and new needs that will require reformulations and re-
creations of rules or propositions once perceived as final doctrinal expositions of dog-
matic significance.
39 As the frequently quiescent operation of the government demonstrates, competi-
tion and confrontation are not necessary conditions at all times and on all issues.
40 Explaining these three cases under a theory of an historical constitution is obvi-
ously quite different from the approach of constitutional historians who normally de-
scribe in detail the context of a single decision or series of decisions. Examples of this
mode of historical scholarship include Friedman, A Search for Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon in Context, 4 LAW & HIST. REv. 1 (1986), and Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-58, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979). These
discrete studies are valuable, but I think that the historical perspective need not always
be focused narrowly-it can be applied across types of cases and over long periods of
time. Needless to say, the risks of superficiality and distortion increase with the use of
such an approach.
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I
BOWSHER iV SYNAR
A. The Decisions
The three judge district court in Synar v. United States41 and the
Supreme Court on an expedited appeal in Bowsher v. Synar42 found
unconstitutional the mandatory appropriation reduction mecha-
nisms of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 ("the Act").43 However, the various opinions of the two courts
and the Supreme Court's two dissenters44 analyze and apply doc-
trine in this case quite differently.
1. The District Court Opinion
The per curiam district court opinion, commonly attributed to
Judge (now Justice) Antonin Scalia, is divided into three parts. In
the first part the district court concluded that Congressman Synar
and the other plaintiffs had standing to sue.45 In the second part the
court rejected the challengers' claim that the Act constituted an im-
permissible delegation of legislative power by the legislative
branch. 46 Although the court asserted that it need not decide the
delegation issue,47 it weighed the issue fully in order to present the
Supreme Court with a full record of the case, thereby forestalling a
remand should the high court reverse on the separation of powers
issue.48 In the third part of the opinion, the district court agreed
with the challengers' claim that the appropriation reduction proce-
dure violated the doctrine of the separation of powers. 49 The court
held that although the Comptroller performed essentially executive
functions under the Act, he was a creature of the legislative branch.
Giving such power over executive functions to Congress violates
the fundamental principle expressed by Montesquieu upon which
the theory of separated powers rests: "When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehen-
sion may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact ty-
41 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986).
42 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
43 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
44 Justices White, Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3205, and Blackmun, id. at 3215.
45 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1379.
46 Id. at 1382.
47 Id. ("It is strictly unnecessary for us to reach this point, since we hold in Part IV
of this opinion that the challenged provisions of the Act are unconstitutional on other
grounds.").
48 Id. at 1382-83.
49 Id. at 1391.
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rannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."'50
There were two necessary predicates to the district court's deci-
sion. First, it concluded that the Comptroller performed an essen-
tially executive function.
Under subsection 251(b)(1), the Comptroller General must spec-
ify levels of anticipated revenue and expenditure that determine
the gross amount which must be sequestered .... The first of
these specifications requires the exercise of substantial judgment
concerning present and future facts that affect the application of
the law-the sort of power normally conferred upon the executive
officer charged with implementing a statute. The second specifi-
cation requires an interpretation of the law enacted by Congress,
similarly a power normally committed initially to the Executive
under the Constitution's prescription that he "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." 51
The second predicate was the district court's holding that the
Comptroller was a legislative branch official. The district court
based this conclusion on the determination that the Comptroller
was removable only as a result of a congressional initiative. In so
ruling, the court implicitly minimized the importance of the Presi-
dent's veto power over any congressional initiative to remove the
Comptroller. 52
2. The Supreme Court Opinion
a. The Majority Opinion. The Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
trict court's result. In his opinion for six justices, ChiefJustice Bur-
ger first concluded that no consideration of the question of
Congressman Synar's standing was necessary because the Treasury
employees' union and at least one named employee plaintiff clearly
had standing.53 At the end of the opinion, in a footnote, ChiefJus-
tice Burger summarily disposed of the delegation issue by stating
that resolution of the delegation issue was unnecessary in view of
the Court's decision on separation of powers. 54
The Chief Justice's opinion is, therefore, largely confined to a
discussion of the "constitutionally imposed" separation-of-powers
50 Id. at 1401-02 (quoting C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws, vol. I, bk. XI, ch.
6, at 152 (London 1823)).
51 Id. at 1400.
52 Id. at 1401. It is, therefore, puzzling and inaccurate for the district court to have
written the following: "The statute governing removal of the Comptroller General, by
contrast, eliminates all presidential power of removal, and-much beyond that-confers
the power of removal upon Congress." Id.
53 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3186.
54 Id. at 3193 n.10.
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issue. The majority55 agreed with the district court that the Act vio-
lated the separation-of-powers doctrine because the Comptroller
performed an essentially executive function 56 yet was removable
only at the initiative of the legislative branch. 57
b. Stevens' Concurrence. Justice Stevens concurred in the judg-
ment. In a separate opinion he found that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers was violated because the Comptroller General,
viewed functionally, is a member of the legislative branch "because of
his longstanding statutory responsibilities." 58 Whereas Scalia and
Burger relied on removal procedures in labeling the Comptroller a
member of the legislative branch, Stevens found the Comptroller's
traditional responsibilities and institutional identification with the
legislative branch to be the crucial and fatal connections. 59 Stevens
concluded,
[W]hen Congress, or a component or an agent of Congress, seeks
to make policy that will bind the Nation, it must follow the proce-
dures mandated by Article I of the Constitution-through passage
by both Houses and presentment to the President. In short, Con-
gress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate na-
tional policy by delegating that power to one of its two Houses, to
a legislative committee, or to an individual agent of the Congress
60
c. The Dissenting Opinions. Justice White dissented from the
judgment. He was not satisfied that the Comptroller should be
viewed as a creature of the legislative branch.6' In addition, Justice
White disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the Comptrol-
ler's function under the Act could confidently be labelled an execu-
tive function.62
55 In reaching this result, the majority quoted Madison's allusion to Montesquieu in
The Federalist No. 47: "[T]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive pow-
ers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates .... 106 S. Ct. at 3186
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325 (U. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961)).
56 Id. at 3188-92.
57 Id. at 3192. In their appeal to the Supreme Court the defenders of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings challenged vigorously the remedy selected by the district court. The
district court remedy invalidated part of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rather than the fifty-
year-old statute which fixed the Comptroller's tenure of office. Chief Justice Burger
rejected this challenge, asserting that the Act's fallback procedure (which replaced se-
questration with joint resolutions to reduce any excess appropriations) "settles the
[remedy] issue." Id. at 3193. Although the district court did not address this issue, the
ChiefJustice's discussion of this issue was presaged to some extent in the district court's
discussion of the ripeness aspect of the separation of powers question. Synar, 626 F.
Supp. at 1392.
58 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3194 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 3196-98.
60 Id. at 3194.
61 Id. at 3208 (White, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 3206-08.
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Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice White but further dis-
sented with respect to the majority's remedy. 6 According to Black-
mun, "the only sensible way to choose between two conjunctively
unconstitutional statutory provisions is to determine which provi-
sion can be invalidated with the least disruption of congressional
objectives."'64 Blackmun felt that the least disruptive route was to
strike down the tenure act; alternatively, the Court should not en-
force that provision when and if anyone tries to remove a
comptroller.
B. Structure Issues
1. Delegation
While the standing and remedies issues in Bowsher are quite in-
teresting, the central concerns of both courts were the plaintiffs'
structural functions arguments. With respect to the delegation doc-
trine issues, the district court opinion stands alone. That court re-
jected the notion that the delegation doctrine is moribund, although
it conceded, "Pragmatically... the Court's decisions display a much
greater deference to Congress' power to delegate." 65 The district
court further rejected a narrow formulation of the delegation doc-
trine that would only prohibit delegation of certain "core functions"
of the legislative branch. 66 Rather, he adhered to the traditional no-
tion that the doctrine requires that delegating legislation provide an
adequately "intelligible principle" 67 to guide and confine adminis-
trative decision making. Under this analysis the court found that the
provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act provided a suffi-
ciently intelligible principle. 68
The district court also rejected a delegation challenge against
section 274(h) of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which pre-
cluded judicial review of "[t]he economic data, assumptions, and
methodologies used by the Comptroller General in computing the
base levels of total revenues and total budget outlays." 69 The court
sustained this provision because the Act's overall constitutionality
remained subject to judicial review and "the exercise of many validly
delegated authorities is statutorily insulated from judicial review." 70
Because the Supreme Court did not reach the delegation issue
63 Id. at 3215 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 3216.
65 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1384.
66 Id. at 1385.
67 Id. at 1389.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1390.
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in Bowsher, the delegation doctrine's current status remains in
doubt. Unfortunately, many of the questions raised in Bowsher con-
cerning the delegation doctrine are directly relevant to resolving
what the Court isolated as "the separation-of-powers" issue. For
example, the major post-Schechter71 delegation cases72 have not
found any delegations excessive. Most of the statutes reviewed in
those cases involved substantial delegations of discretionary law-for-
mulating powers to the executive branch or independent agencies.7"
Therefore, it is unclear what would constitute an impermissible del-
egation. Similarly, it seems impossible in light of post-Schechter de-
velopments to maintain that the executive branch and independent
agencies do not perform functions which are at least partially legis-
lative in character. If this is the case, then Bowsher's assumption that
each branch may only perform certain determinate, assigned func-
tions is seriously undermined.
2. Separation of Powers
The district court and the Supreme Court agreed that the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine. The Constitution, of course, establishes no unitary doc-
trine of the separation of powers. Rather, the notion of separated
powers is reflected in several constitutional provisions and the
works of Montesquieu, which undeniably affected the design of the
Constitution of 1787.74
Reading the Constitution with regard to structure, articles I, 11,
and III respectively confer legislative, executive, and judicial power
on the separate branches of the federal government: Congress, the
President, and the federal courts. However, there is considerable
overlap of these functions. The President plays a legislative role in
71 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975); Fahey v. Mallo-
nee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516 (1944).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (upholding congressional
delegation of power to regulate distribution of alcoholic beverages on Indian reserva-
tion to reservation's tribal council); United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537 (1950) (upholding congressional delegation to Secretary of State and Attorney Gen-
eral of power to promulgate regulations under which aliens may be excluded); Bowles
v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (upholding delegation of power to fix rents pursuant
to Emergency Price Controls Act to Price Administrator); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding delegation of power to FCC to make
regulations in public interest).
74 The leading scholar on the history of the idea of separated powers has con-
cluded, however, that the framers of the United States Constitution did not accept the
extreme, French version of the idea. Rather, the Constitution adopts a conception of
checks and balances which requires the branches to interact rather than be totally iso-
lated from each other. See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
119-75 (1967).
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vetoing or approving proposed legislation. 75 Judicial review by the
courts presupposes scrutiny of the validity of the executive and leg-
islative branches' actions. Finally, Congress has the power to block
certain appointments, reject treaties and other executive agree-
ments, and control to some extent the jurisdiction and structure of
the federal courts. 76
a. Executive and Legislative Functions. Bowsher assumes that the
courts are able to label certain governmental functions as either leg-
islative or executive. Both Burger for the Supreme Court77 and the
district court 78 based their invalidation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings budget reduction sequestration procedure on their conclu-
sions that the Comptroller was to perform, at least in part, an
executive function.
The Constitution provides no sure guide for determining what
is an executive, legislative, or judicial function. As the district court
opinion demonstrates, 79 cases abound in which the courts have per-
mitted performance of judicial functions normally within the grant
of article III by article I executive branch officials. 80 However, in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 81 the Court
declared provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 197882 unconstitu-
tional because it conferred article III powers on article I judges.83
And in Buckley v. Valeo, 84 the Court held that a portion of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197185 was
invalid because it conferred adjudicative and executive functions on
commissioners of the Federal Election Commission not appointed
pursuant to the appointments clause of the Constitution.86 Both de-
cisions strike down statutory schemes based on an impermissible as-
signment of functions, but neither opinion provides significant
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
76 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, §§ 1-2.
77 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
78 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1400. Congress attempted to make the Comptroller ap-
pear to act ministerially rather than to exercise discretion in making policy judgments
because of the threat of a separation of powers challenge. Both courts, however, re-
jected this effort. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192; Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1399-1400.
79 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1399-1403.
80 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (holding findings of fact by dep-
uty commissioner of United States Compensation Commission in suit for compensation
by injured maritime employee final).
81 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
82 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2657 (1978).
83 Article I judges are not life tenured. U.S. CoNT. art. I, § 8.
84 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
85 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 310-315, 88 Stat.
1263, 1280-87 (1974) (amending Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971)).
86 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140. Some commissioners were appointed by the Speaker of
the House, some by the President, and some by the Senate leadership.
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discussion of or guidance about how one identifies these three pur-
portedly discrete functions.
Thus, a central feature of Bowsher, the ability to identify execu-
tive functions and to proscribe nonexecutive officials from exercis-
ing them, is tremendously indefinite. As the district court
recognized (but the Supreme Court did not), past decisions permit-
ting congressional limits on the President's removal power, approv-
ing the existence of federal agencies substantially independent of
the President, or approving legislative delegations have character-
ized such officials and agencies as "quasi-judicial," "legislative
courts," or some other branch amalgam.8 7 Therefore, to hold that
the Comptroller is an executive branch official because he "exe-
cute[s] the laws ' 88 or because he has considerable discretion8 9 only
begins the analysis. 90 Nevertheless, the two courts reached their re-
spective conclusions based on these generalities.
b. Executive v. Legislative Officials. A second crucial premise in
both the district court and Burger opinions is that courts can iden-
tify an individual as a member of the executive or legislative branch
on the basis of his tenure of office and that the Comptroller was,
based on applying this method, a legislative branch official or agent.
As the district court recognized, however, the line of cases concern-
ing the President's removal power is difficult to reconcile and sheds
only indirect light on the question of whether the Comptroller is
more appropriately a legislative or an executive official. 91
Both Burger and the district court concluded that the power to
remove the Comptroller rested with Congress alone and therefore
characterized him as a legislative branch official. The Chief Justice
wrote:
Although the President could veto such ajoint resolution, the
veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of
Congress. Thus, the Comptroller General could be removed in
the face of Presidential opposition. Like the District Court.... we
therefore read the removal provision as authorizing removal by
Congress alone.92
This startling conclusion is especially curious in light of the Court's
87 SVnra; 626 F. Supp. at 1396-97.
88 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189.
89 Syria?; 626 F. Supp. at 1403.
9o Presumably all governmental officials and most citizens "execute" the laws in
certain situations. And, as modern notions ofjurisprudence or political theory tell us.
judges and legislators both have considerable discretion in the performance of their
jobs.
91 Synrn; 626 F. Supp. at 1393.
92 Bowsher. 106 S. Ct. at 3189 n.7 (citing district court opinion, 626 F. Supp. at 1393
n.2 1).
1987] 565
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
reasoning in INS v. Chadha,93 in which it held legislative vetoes un-
constitutional because the President had no role in the process. At
the least, Chief'Justice Burger's view that the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Act authorized removal by Congress alone overstates what the
Act, in fact, provided.
c. The Removal Cases. The cases involving the President's re-
moval power play two roles in Bowsher, although neither court ex-
plicitly recognized this dual role. First, they provide indirect
evidence about the branch to which the Comptroller properly be-
longs. Second, they involve the issue, also embedded in Bowsher,
whether the congressional power to remove the Comptroller en-
croached upon the President's constitutional appointments power.94
Both opinions blended indistinguishably consideration of this sec-
ond issue into the first.
The five major removal cases95 decided by the Supreme Court
have involved questions different from those in Bowsher; specifically,
those cases considered whether and in what ways Congress may
limit the executive branch's power to remove an official. The first
two cases involved interpretations of statutory removal provisions.
United States v. Perkins96 concerned a naval cadet dismissed by the
Secretary of the Navy for a reason not specified in the statute setting
the terms of his office. The cadet sued for and won an award of back
pay. The Court held that Congress may "restrict the [executive
branch's] power of removal as it deems best for the public interest"
and that, therefore, the cadet could not be dismissed except pursu-
ant to the statute.97 In Shurtleffv. United States98 the Court construed
a tenure statute to provide that President McKinley had residual
power to dismiss a government appraiser appointed with Senate
confirmation. The tenure statute enumerated certain reasons which
could lead to a dismissal99 but the court held, in effect, that the
enumeration was non-exclusive.1 00
93 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
94 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
95 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'rv. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Shurtleff v. United
States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886). A sixth
case, Exparle Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839), concerned whether a district court
judge had an implied power to remove a clerk he had appointed. The Court held that
one could properly infer under the Constitution that the power to appoint carried with it
the power to remove "[iln the absence of all constitutional provision, or statutory regu-
lation." Id. at 259.
96 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
97 Id. at 485.
98 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
99 The enumerated reasons for dismissal included "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office." Id. at 313.
t) Shurtleff and Perkins are reconcilable only as exercises in statutory interpretation.
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The remaining three cases do not involve fairly pure questions
of statutory interpretation but consider whether the statute, as
clearly drafted, violated the Constitution. Myers v. United States 10 1 is
the most significant of these removal cases. The Supreme Court in
Myers invalidated a statute which required that the Senate advise and
consent to the removal, as well as the appointment, of a postmaster.
In a long opinion, ChiefJustice Taft held that Congress could not so
limit the President's power over certain employees performing exec-
utive functions. 10 2 Justice Holmes10 3 and Justice McReynolds 0 4
dissented in part because they saw no way to determine what was an
executive, as opposed to a legislative, function. Holmes also felt
that the President's duty to execute the laws included executing laws
which required the advice and consent of Congress or the Senate in
a removal. 10 5
Taft's opinion in Myers reaches three interrelated conclusions.
First, the Constitution generally separates and isolates the exercise
of the three functions of government.' 0 6 Second, appointment and
removal of officers of the United States pursuant to article II, sec-
tion 2, clause 2 is an executive function; thus the President should
have free removal power.10 7 Third, the inference of a free presiden-
tial removal power over officers of the United States is supported
In Perkins the Court interpreted the statute's removal provisions to be exclusive and
upheld them; in Shurtleff the Court interpreted the removal provisions to be nonexclu-
sive and therefore never reached the constitutional question.
101 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
102 Taft's opinion presaged the opinion of Justice Sutherland the next term in
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), in which the Court, in a quo warranto
proceeding, denied the validity of colonial legislative branch appointments of directors
of the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank. Justice Sutherland
wrote, "[Tihe legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office ... 
Id. at 202. Justice Holmes, in dissent, responded,
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise
it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction be-
tween legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desira-
ble to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitu-
tion requires.
Id. at 211.
Springer is one of a group of United States Supreme Court decisions rejecting vari-
ous facets of the legal structure of the American colonial administration in the Philip-
pines. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926); Carino v. Philippine Islands,
212 U.S. 449 (1909); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). While it is hard to
generalize, these decisions seems to impose most aspects of the American legal order on
the colonial government. Chief Justice Taft, who was on the Court at the time of
Springer, had previously served as a colonial administrator in the Philippines.
103 Vyets, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 178 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1065 Id. at 108-09 (majority opinion).
107 Id. at 176.
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both by historical practice' 08 and by the requirement that the Presi-
dent alone must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 09
Taft concluded that "the provision of the law of 1876, by which the
unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to
the President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid."'' °
The Court's opinion in Myers goes beyond prohibiting congres-
sional participation in removals to bar any limitation on the Presi-
dent's removal power over officers of the United States. At the
same time, Taft reaffirmed the conclusion reached in Perkins that
Congress could by statute restrict or limit a department head's re-
moval power over officials who were not officers of the United States
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate:
The Perkins case is limited to the vesting by Congress of the ap-
pointment of an inferior officer in the head of a department.... If
[Congress] does not choose to entrust the appointment of such
inferior officers to less authority than the President with the con-
sent of the Senate, it has no power of providing for their
removal. " II
Thus, Taft's decision relied more on the statute's interference with
the President's power than on congressional involvement in the re-
moval process.
The next removal case, Humphrey's Executor v. United States,t" 2
was decided in the midst of a major battle between the Court and
the President but not one between the President and Congress.
President Franklin Roosevelt purported to dismiss a commissioner
of the Federal Trade Commission but did not claim to be exercising
108 First, Taft relied particularly on the Decision of 1789, in which Congress deter-
mined not to enact a proviso that the head of an executive branch department could be
dismissed by the President without Senate consent even though the Senate had con-
firmed his appointment. Id. at 114-15.
Second, Taft carefully minimized the significance of the statement in Federalist Paper
No. 77 that the Senate would have to advise and consent to the removal as well as the
appointment of executive branch officials on the basis that its author, Alexander Hamil-
ton, later changed his mind. Id. at 136-37.
Third, Taft mentioned Andrew Jackson's message of February 10, 1835 in which
Jackson claimed that the president had exclusive and plenary removal power over execu-
tive branch officials. Id. at 158-61.
Finally, Taft discussed the major controversy that ensued when the post-Civil War
congresses, opposed to President AndrewJohnson, passed the Tenure-of-Office Act, ch.
154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), which provided that certain executive department officials were
to serve until their successors had been confirmed. Myers, 272 U.S. at 165-68. This act
was repealed in 1887. Ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887). Taft rejected the argument that the
tenure acts were solid precedent for the 1876 statute requiring advice and consent for
the removal of a postmaster. Myers, 272 U.S. at 175-76.
10) U.S. CONST. art. II § 3.
1 10 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
M'' Id. at 162.
112 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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a statutory removal power. The underlying act provided for re-
moval only in certain circumstances. Roosevelt argued that Myers
recognized a residual power in the President to dismiss any execu-
tive branch employee without cause.1 13
Justice Sutherland, one of Roosevelt's protagonists in the larger
struggle, wrote the majority opinion in Humphrey's Executor. He re-
jected Roosevelt's argument and held that Myers was confined to
"purely executive" officers.114 By contrast, a Federal Trade Com-
missioner's "duties are neither political nor executive, but predomi-
nantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative." 1 5  Sutherland
concluded that the Commission was not part of the executive
branch"16 and, therefore, that the case was not controlled by
Myers. 117
The final removal case, Wiener v. United States," 8 concerned the
validity of President Eisenhower's dismissal without cause of a com-
missioner of the War Claims Commission appointed with Senate
confirmation."19 The Court awarded back pay to Wiener; it relied
on the framework of Humphrey's Executor and concluded that Wiener
was exercising quasi-judicial functions. The Court reached this re-
sult even though the statute in question was quite similar to the one
in Shurtleff which the Court had interpreted the other way.
The five removal cases establish several guidelines about re-
movability. First, Congress may not limit the President's power to
remove a member of the executive branch who is an officer of the
United States by requiring Congress to advise and consent in a re-
moval. Second, Congress may limit the reasons for which a depart-
ment head may remove other executive branch employees who are
not officers of the United States. Third, Congress may limit the
power of the President to remove certain officers of the United
States who are performing nonexecutive branch functions. Fourth,
the Court has never approved explicit statutory limitations on the
President's power to remove an officer of the United States even
without congressional participation; indeed, the Shurtleff Court con-
strued a fairly clear statute to avoid such a limitation.
The removal cases do not support either court's conclusions in
'13 Id. at 626.
114 Id. at 632.
115 Id. at 624.
116 Id. at 628.
117 Although the district court suggested in Synar that the underlying logic of the
result in Humphrey's Executor was no longer valid, 626 F. Supp. at 1397, it treated the
result in that case (and the four others) as still binding. ChiefJustice Burger relied on
Humphrey s Executor in Bowsher as general support for the notion that separation-of-pow-
ers considerations affect appointments and removal cases. Bowshey, 106 S. Ct. at 3188.
118 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
1 Id. at 350.
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Bowsher regarding the branch to which the Comptroller belonged
and the extent of the President's powers under the appointments
clause. First, the removal cases provide no direct authority as to
what constitutes an executive function; in fact, they declare that cer-
tain law-executing activities are quasi-judicial. Second, while the re-
sult in Myers supports the conclusion reached in Bowsher on the
appointments clause issue, the Myers logic, applied consistently,
would go far beyond Bowsher and the Act. The Court in Myers rea-
soned that Congress may impose no limitation on a President's right
to remove officers of the United States. This conclusion could inval-
idate the current tenure of many important governmental officials or
lead to the demise of independent regulatory agencies within the
executive branch. Taft's Myers decision, if accepted fully, would also
allow Congress to limit significantly the grounds for removing only
those executive branch officials who are not officers of the United
States.
3. INS v. Chadha
Bowsher came shortly after the Court's decisions in INS v.
Chadha 120 and Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co. 121 In both decisions the Court struck down significant legisla-
tion based on interpretations of the general notion of separated
powers. Chadha was still on the minds of all members of the
Supreme Court as they decided Bowsher: the Court's majority opin-
ion, like the district court's before it, struggled to squeeze Bowsher
into the Chadha mold. In Chadha the legislative veto was held uncon-
stitutional because less than the entire constitutional legislative
branch could alter the design or the implementation of the law. 122
Thus, in Bowsher, both Chief Justice Burger 123 and the district
court 124 concluded that despite the President's role in the removal
process, Congress, by virtue of its power to override a presidential
veto, has ultimate control over that process. Justice White correctly
pointed out the Court's quick elision of this point. 125
Chadha sheds little direct light on the separation-of-powers
question raised in Bowsher. Although the majority opinion in Chadha
120 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
121 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
122 The Court stressed the constitutional requirements of presidential presentment
and bicameralism. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-51.
123 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189 n.7.
124 Syn.a; 626 F. Supp. at 1401.
12.5 Bowshe; 106 S. Ct. at 3209-10 (White,J, dissenting).Justice White noted that the
majority ignored the difference between the legislative veto in Chadha and the congres-
sional removal provision in Bowsher. Under the latter, Congress can remove the Comp-
troller only by joint resolution which must pass both houses and be signed by the
president or repass with two-thirds majorities after a presidential rejection. Id. at 3210.
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concludes that the veto was an impermissible exercise of legislative
power1 26 and thus rests, like Bowsher, on a delineation of legislative
and executive functions, the opinion fails to explain why the deter-
mination of whether to deport could be delegated to the Attorney
General. 127 Furthermore, most observers would probably agree
that the particular governmental action taken in Chadha constituted
the exercise of either an executive or judicial, rather than legislative,
function.
C. The Expressive Function?
One explanation for the doctrinal sponginess and confusion in
Bowsher and the other separation-of-powers cases is that these cases
represent an exercise of an expressive function of constitutional law.
Phillip Bobbitt has offered this explanation in other contexts. 128
Thus, according to Bobbitt, National League of Cities v. Usery 129 was
essentially a nondoctrinally quantifiable assertion of the continued
importance of the federal system. Similarly, Bowsher and Chadha may
be imprecise reminders to the participants in the national political
arena of the continued importance of separated powers and
functions.
D. An Historical Approach
Bobbitt's expressive function theory may partially explain cases
like Bowsher, but one can say more. In areas of general constitu-
tional prescription, a dynamic underlying social and political order,
even one committed to a continuing reverence for the text of the
Constitution, has the maximum ability to create, change, and re-
create the very core of those general constitutional understandings.
In this context, the naturally competitive forces of a society and the
segments of its governmental structure conflict. The tension cre-
ated by this structural conflict shapes the content of the Court's ex-
pression in cases like Bowsher.
Both the Supreme Court and the district court in Bowsher are
inclined to desert the rationale of Humphrey's Executor while keeping
its holding. At the same time, although both courts rely heavily on
Myers, they ignore its basic premise that Congress's power to control
the tenure of executive branch officials should be severely limited.
126 Ciadia, 462 U.S. at 951-59.
127 In a footnote the Court responds to this argument by stating that "[this] kind of
Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized
it." Id. at 953 n.16. Presumably, the President had approved the legislative veto on
numerous occasions.
128 P. BOBMT-r, supra note 1, at 196-219.
129 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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In neither Bowsher opinion is there a precise delineation of what
Congress did that caused it to cross the forbidden line. Conversely,
there is no limitation on, or even recognition of, the existence of
considerable cross-branch functioning.
Although doctrine provides no sure explanation of Bowsher, his-
tory may. Both Bowsher and Chadha seem to reflect the continuing
fear that the presidency had been attacked or weakened in the post-
Watergate, post-Vietnam era. ChiefJustice Burger asserted in Bow-
sher, "The dangers of Congressional usurpation of Executive Branch
functions have long been recognized."'' 3 0  Similarly, Myers was
handed down during the relatively weak presidency of Calvin Coo-
lidge. By contrast, Humphrey's Executor was decided at a time when
fear of presidential domination was significant.
History is complex and legal decisions do not follow in direct
response to the crises and headlines of the moment. But it would
not be odd to find that judges, particularly conservative judges, in-
terpreting very general and imprecise notions of separated powers
would tilt against what they perceive as an era's aggressive force in
order to sustain competition and balance at the heart of the govern-
ment. As ChiefJustice Burger stated, "[T]his system of division and
separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance
at times,"'' 1 but its goal is the avoidance of tyranny.
Bowsher also reflects a theme in American constitutional history
broader than one could make out from a minute contextualization
of the separation-of-powers cases. Bowsher represents a fear of con-
centrations of power. Two major episodes in constitutional history
illustrating this theme are the Supreme Court's acceptance of fed-
eral and, to a lesser extent, state railroad rate regulation 132 and the
federal antitrust laws. 133 The Court upheld these statutory schemes
in the face of the enormous power of the interests arrayed against
such regulation and the comparative weakness of the public sector.
More recently, the Court's decisions in Chadha, Buckley, and now
130 106 S. Ct. at 3189.
131 Id. at 3187.
132 See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Shreveport
Rate Case); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (con-
demnation of railroad property upheld in face of due process challenge); see also Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding state regulation of prices of grain warehouses).
133 See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (dissolving combina-
tion scheme between Great Northern and Northern Pacific railways); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (breaking up interstate (e.g., commerce)
aspects of combination of iron-pipe manufacturers); United States v. E.C. Knight Co..
156 U.S. 1 (1895) (implicitly approving antitrust law but holding that sugar refining was
part of manufacturing and, therefore, not part of commerce). It is, of course, true that
in some of the early cases like E.C. Knight, particular monopolies were declared not cov-
ered by the antitrust laws because manufacturing was not considered a part of interstate
commerce and was therefore not subject to federal regulation.
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Bowsher have revived this theme and transported it to justify careful
consideration of power relationships in the national government.
In sum, Bowsher is not the natural outcome of a process of ever-
perfecting doctrinal development. Nor is it the product of irrational
or random events or of an inexorable class struggle. Rather, it
seems to reflect a continuing judicial and societal adherence to a
fear of concentrations of power. The cases discussed can thus be
explained as continuing adjustments countering perceived concen-
trations of power. That Congress might become the object of this
fear in the era of the modem presidency could not have been pre-
dicted twenty-five years ago. After the shocks 134 of those twenty-five
years, though, the Court seems to be attempting to maintain a bal-
ance in the national government. This process has involved striking
down innovations in the interaction between the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches and protecting the judiciary's exclusive territory
more vigorously than past precedents would have suggested.
II
PENNHURST
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman' 3 5 was a procedur-
ally complex pendent jurisdiction case. Residents of a Pennsylvania
facility for the mentally retarded had challenged the conditions of
their care. The plaintiffs brought their claim in federal court based
on the fourteenth amendment due process clause and federal and
state statutes establishing rehabilitation programs for retarded peo-
ple.136 The Court of Appeals, in a ruling which directly preceded
Supreme Court consideration, found that a state statute had been
violated, awarded damages, and ordered state officials to upgrade
the facility in various ways. 13 7 The Court of Appeals did not reach
the federal issues in part because of the judicial doctrine that cases
should be disposed of on a non-constitutional basis whenever possi-
ble.138 The Court of Appeals rejected the state's argument that the
court order violated the eleventh amendment by being based solely
on state law. 139 Based on considerations of comity, the court also
134 1 would include in this category Nixon's fall, Johnson's end of the Vietnam War
paralysis, and Ford's and Carter's failures to be reelected.
135 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
136 Id. at 92.
137 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 661 (3d Cir. 1982).
1-38 Id. at 658; see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 95-96; see also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.
R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) ("Where a case in this court can be decided without refer-
ence to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued
and is not departed from without important reasons.").
139 Pennhurst, 673 F.2d at 659.
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declined to abstain from acting.140 Pennsylvania appealed the Court
of Appeals order as to the eleventh amendment and comity issues.
The Supreme Court found that the eleventh amendment had been
violated and reversed the Court of Appeals.
A. The Eleventh Amendment Issue
The history of the eleventh amendment in the federal courts is
long and intricate. Congress passed the amendment to prevent pro-
spectively the result reached in Chisolm v. Georgia.'4' In that case
out-of-state plaintiffs were allowed to sue Georgia in federal court
even though the doctrine of sovereign immunity apparently barred
the same action in state court. 142 The curiously indirect wording of
the eleventh amendment 43 has been held in a long line of cases to
"exemplify" the notion that the jurisdictional grant in article III was
not intended to eliminate the defense of state sovereign immunity in
federal court proceedings.' 44 Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana 145 the Court
held that a federal court action by a citizen against his own state
might also be abated on the ground of the sovereign's immunity.' 46
The operation of a state's sovereign immunity in a federal pro-
ceeding involving federal claims has been an issue in numerous
cases. The Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity is no
bar to an action by the United States against a state.' 47 Very little
else is clear.
In Ex parte Young 148 the Court decided that sovereign immunity
did not bar a federal court from prospectively enjoining a state offi-
cial from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute. The Court
barred Minnesota's attorney general from enforcing a state railroad
rate regulation which unconstitutionally took the plaintiff's property
by imposing unfair rates. Minnesota's doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity barred any state court challenge of these rates. Justice Peckham
wrote:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it
be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitu-
140 Id. at 659-60.
141 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793); see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 97-98.
142 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 479-80.
143 "TheJudicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XI.
144 E.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 98-99.
145 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
146 Id at 20-21.
147 See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) (state consents to suit by
United States upon entry into Union).
148 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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tional act to the injury of the complainants is a proceeding without
the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sov-
ereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon
the part of a state official .... [H]e is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character .... 149
Exparte Young must be interpreted cautiously in light of the cir-
cumstances under which it arose. It is one of a series of decisions in
which the federal courts imposed limits on aggressive state regula-
tion of large business enterprises, especially railroads.' 50 Thus, the
Court's willingness to disregard federalism should be discounted to
some extent. At the same time, if sovereign immunity could bar fed-
eral and, of course, state litigation of federal claims, then the Consti-
tution's supremacy principle would be rendered meaningless.
Thus, a more theoretically sound decision in Ex parte Young would
have held that a state is not sovereignly immune to federal constitu-
tional claims even in its own courts.
Exparte Young's fiction-that an erring state officer was stripped
of his or her official character-eliminated the problem of sovereign
immunity in cases involving federal constitutional claims when only
prospective, injunctive relief is sought. Post-Exparte Young decisions
have replaced this fiction to some extent with a test balancing the
justification for sovereign immunity against the importance of the
particular federal right asserted. In Edelman v. Jordan,15 the leading
recent case, Justice Rehnquist held that sovereign immunity barred
a suit seeking retroactive payments of welfare benefits which went
unpaid in violation of federal law. Because a retroactive award
would necessarily come from the state's general coffers, a significant
state interest existed.' 52 Justice Rehnquist concluded, "As in most
areas of the law, the difference between the type of relief barred by
149 Id. at 159-60. Justice Peckham also wrote the majority opinion in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state statute limiting hours of labor held unconstitu-
tional). Both cases struck down state attempts to regulate commerce as
unconstitutional.
150 See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (Nebraska statute fixing reasonable max-
imum railway rates deprived companies of just compensation); Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (Minnesota statute establishing commis-
sion to regulate railroad rates held unconstitutional because it deprived railroads of
property without due process of law and of equal protection of the laws). The Supreme
Court approved and enforced, however, similar federal regulatory programs. See text
accompanying supra note 132; see also Cook, History of Rate-Determination Under the Due
Process Clauses, 11 U. CHi. L. REV. 297 (1944).
151 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Rehnquist, writing again for the majority after Edelman,
concluded that the eleventh amendment does not bar suits in federal court premised on
causes of action created by Congress pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see also Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
152 Retroactive payment in this case "resembles far more closely [a] monetary award
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the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young
will not, in many instances, be that between day and night."' 53
B. The Pennhurst Decisions
With the post-eleventh amendment cases as their primary refer-
ence point, the Pennhurst justices considered the Pennhurst resi-
dents' claims. Justice Stevens, in a biting dissent, 54 bitterly
disagreed with Justice Powell's majority opinion about the correct
characterization of the cases that followed Ex parte Young. Even Jus-
tice Stevens, however, did not argue that the Supreme Court had
fully and forthrightly decided the issue of whether a state official's
violation of state law also strips away sovereign immunity. 155 How-
ever, Justice Stevens did claim that this stripping had in fact oc-
curred in some cases.156
Thus, Pennhurst presented a somewhat novel question. Justice
Powell argued that to deprive a state of sovereign immunity when it
violated its own law would be to "emasculate the Eleventh Amend-
ment."1 57 Justice Stevens seemed to suggest that this emasculation
had already occurred.158 Perhaps behind Justice Stevens's venom
lay his apprehensions about potential problem cases arising from
the majority's decision.
The majority concluded that sovereign immunity barred the
Pennhurst school remedial order and remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals for a reconsideration of the federal issues.' 59 This
disposition may cause administrative problems in pendent jurisdic-
tional proceedings in which some, but not all, claims are subject to a
defense of sovereign immunity. Justice Powell noted in response to
this possibility that pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made conven-
against the state itself than it does prospective injunctive relief." Edelnian, 415 U.S. at
665 (citation omitted).
153 Id. at 667.
154 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Although part II of Justice Stevens' opinion is quite emphatic, a careful reading
of his description of case holdings suggests that I am correct. Id. at 130-39.
156 Id. at 132-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 106 (majority opinion).
158 Id. at 130-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 124-25 (majority opinion). This decision came at the end of a long series of
decisions, including prior review by the Supreme Court itself. In its first consideration
of the case the Court held that section 111 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982), did not create any substantive rights.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1981). The Court
then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of remaining state
law, and federal constitutional and statutory issues. Id. at 31. The Court did not in its
first decision consider whether a decision premised solely on state law would violate the
eleventh amendment.
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ience without an explicit basis in article 111160 and that in many cases
parallel proceedings in state and federal courts already take
place.' 61
Pennhurst will affect only those cases in which a sovereign immu-
nity defense is available, including cases in which a plaintiff seeks
non-prospective injunctive relief or damages. Thus, if the state has
consented, waived, or abolished its immunity, no eleventh amend-
ment problem will arise with a decree like the one the Court of Ap-
peals entered. Nevertheless, the decision will impose costs in future
litigation because a state's sovereign immunity status must be ascer-
tained at an early point in such pendent proceedings or multiple
proceedings may be required in some situations.1 62
C. Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Reasonable and intelligent justices obviously disagreed about
the meaning of the doctrine and precedent confronting them in Pen-
nhurst. Justice Stevens stated that the fiction of stripping extended
to violations of state law. 163 Justice Brennan in a separate dissent
argued that the eleventh amendment does not apply to a case be-
tween a state and its own citizens and called for the overruling of
Hans v. Louisiana.164 Justice Powell implies that assuming that fed-
eral jurisdiction exists, the eleventh amendment precludes action in
a federal court if state law is in question and there has been no
waiver.' 65 If federal rights are violated, then Edelman's balancing
seems to be in order.
One could argue that the federal courts in Pennhurst should
have abstained from passing on the state law issue: the Court of Ap-
peals decided a significant question of Pennsylvania law on which
the federal courts needed additional state law guidance. 166 The
160 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 120.
161 Id. at 122.
162 In addition, there remains the difficult question of whether the remedy sought is
for "past" as opposed to "continuing" violations of federal law. See, e.g., Papasan v.
Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2942 (1986) ("We discern no substantive difference between a
not-yet-extinguished liability for a past breach of trust and the continuing obligation to
meet trust responsibilities asserted by the petitioners.").
163 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 158.
164 Id. at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in a later decision, embraced
the substance ofJustice Brennan's dissent. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("Additional study has made it abundantly
clear that not only Edelman, but Hans v. Louisiana as well, can properly be characterized
as 'egregiously incorrect.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Florida Dep't of Health v. Flor-
ida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
165 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 121.
166 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had decided in In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 96,
429 A.2d 631, 636 (1981) that the state statute required the state to adopt the "least
restrictive environment" approach to the care of retarded persons.
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Court of Appeals might have avoided a decision premised on state
law or declined to rule for reasons of comity. On the other hand,
given the current judicial distaste for abstention, the Pennsylvania
courts provided sufficient guidance to render use of that device
unjustified. 167
Because of the unlikelihood of abstention, Pennhurst should be
evaluated in terms of eleventh amendment doctrine. Pennhurst is a
case with more basis for doctrinal certitude than Bowsher or Chadha
because, as Justice Powell argued, it presents starkly the question of
whether the eleventh amendment has any content. Even though the
long line of precedent suggests that the eleventh amendment's con-
tent can be balanced away, nothing in the amendment's text or
background justifies the adoption of the stripping fiction.
Stripping was generated by a result-oriented jurisprudence
which assumes that controversies must be resolvable, yet the fram-
ers may have contemplated that certain controversies in which a
state is a party would not be resolvable by judicial process. 68 In any
event, it is impossible to derive from article III's general grant of
federal jurisdiction a specific direction to enforce federal rights
against the states. 69 Even the Court, in Edelman and elsewhere, has
167 The classic case of discretionary abstention is Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (remanding case to state court for definitive construction
of state statute alleged to discriminate against black porters by requiring white conduc-
tors to attend sleeping cars in to avoid "needless friction" with state policies). But in
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), where an anti-communist state oath law was
challenged under the first amendment, the Supreme Court held that abstention is not
proper where a statute is unconstitutional on its face. In Colorado River Water Conser-
vation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the Court laid out the various bases
for abstention. Id. at 813-17. It found that none of them applied in that case but dis-
missed the action on the "separate" ground that to do so comported with "wise judicial
administration" in view of contemporaneous state court proceedings. Id. at 817.
Strident anti-abstention commentary can be found in Redish, Abstention, Separation of
Powers, and the Limits of theJudicial Function, 94 YALE LJ. 71 (1984) and Redish, The Doc-
trine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463
(1978). For a more balanced view, see Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of
the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
The abstention doctrine may be reviving. In the most recent Term a unanimous
Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit decision which halted a pending state adminis-
trative civil rights proceeding on the ground that it infringed religious freedom. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986). The
Court reinstated a district court order abstaining under the doctrine of Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), from intervening in that proceeding. Dayton Christian Schools, 106
S. Ct. at 2720.
168 It is certainly clear that the Framers did not give the scope ofjudicial power and
authority systematic attention. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTrrTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 154 (1913).
169 Herbert Wechsler finds such a direction implicit in the supremacy clause.
Wechsler, supra note 2, at 3. But that clause omits any mention of federal judges and, at
the least, implies that state court judges will normally be the first line of defense in
ensuring that the supremacy principle is observed. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, cl. 2. Wechsler
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found its earlier decision in Ex parte Young hard to explain if one
believes that the eleventh amendment has content.
D. The Expressive and Historical Element
Pennhurst has, to employ Bobbitt's formulation, an expressive
element: it reminds the courts of the existence of the federal system
and highlights the states' continuing power to assert or to waive
their historical immunity. 170 But Pennhurst cannot be formulated
into neatly expressed principles of lasting linguistic value.
One can say more about Pennhurst. Like the themes in Bowsher
and other cases involving structural constitutional issues which can-
not successfully be enshrined by language, the issues and results in
Pennhurst are particularly susceptible to historical rearrangement by
and in response to the changing demands of the social order. While
our political system formally remains federal in structure, there has
been a sustained augmentation of the power and responsibility of
the national government. Frequently national power has been en-
hanced with the specific goal of overwhelming state resistance, even
in areas of traditional state responsibility such as crime, health, and
safety. It would be curious to find that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity could long resist that trend. And once that doctrine was
breached by ajudicial fiction, as it was in Exparte Young and its prog-
eny, it is hard to stop the process of contraction.
Yet Pennhurst represents some degree of hedging on the trend
of federal domination of the states. As discussed in the next section,
Garcia seems inconsistently to indicate that the courts will never
limit the direct exercise of a federal power, in that case the com-
merce power, by reference to state sovereignty. This result is in line
with historical developments in American society and government
since 1860. These two tendencies may be reconciled if one under-
stands that while Pennhurst suggests that although the federal courts
will, as a result of historical developments, decline to limit a direct
exercise of an enumerated federal power, they may recognize (and
perhaps even enhance) state sovereignty in other situations. Thus,
one might predict a revival of abstention. 171 One other possible ex-
planation is that Pennhurst merely reflects the docket-clearing priori-
ties of the recently retired Chief Justice.
To the extent that Pennhurst reflects either residual deference to
the states or fear of the alleged problem of overloaded federal court
suggests that state court judges are mentioned primarily to remind them of the princi-
pie. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 3.
170 Justice Powell discusses the fact that a state may consent to be sued only in a
particular forum, which is not necessarily a federal court. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 n.9.
171 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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dockets, it closely resembles Stone v. Powell,' 72 decided in 1976. In
Stone the Court limited federal habeas corpus consideration of
search and seizure claims originating in state proceedings. The
Court held that federal habeas corpus review of such claims is ap-
propriate only if a petitioner was denied "full and fair litigation" of
such claims by the state.' 73
To say that Pennhurst resembles Stone is, of course, only a partial
explanation, particularly when Pennhurst is compared with Garcia.
An historical explanation for developments in constitutional law
presupposes that the explanation for a particular result can be
found only in continuing or changing social perceptions of the ques-
tions involved. Pennhurst, like Bowsher, reflects a continuing social
fear of concentrations of power.
III
GARCIA
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 174 apparently
halts for the present the Supreme Court's search for affirmative lim-
its on Congress's commerce power arising from state sovereignty.
The search began in National League of Cities v. Usery, t 75 when the
Court invalidated some amendments to the federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act' 76 which applied federal wage and hour rules to municipal
fire and police workers. In the nine years that followed the Court
considered five major commerce clause cases. According to the ma-
jority in Garcia, the Court in those cases was unable to articulate a
workable standard for determining tangible limits under the com-
merce power on federal action affecting state governmental powers.
A. Federalism and the Commerce Clause
Garcia represents the most visible, recent example of collective
doctrinal uncertainty within the Court. 177 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association 178 the Court attempted mid-way
through the post-Usery cases to promulgate a four-pronged test. To
172 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
173 Id. at 482. AlthoughJustice Powell's opinion for the majority is largely confined
to a discussion of the role of and justification for the exclusionary rule, Justice Brennan
in dissent wrote that these cases "involve the question of the availability of afederalforum
for vindicating those federally guaranteed rights." Id. at 503.
174 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
175 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
176 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(1974).
177 The fourth amendment is less of an example of collective uncertainty because
some of the justices have fairly precise doctrinal views on the issue. See, e.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
178 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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offend state sovereignty, a challenged federal regulation first had to
regulate the state as a state. 179 Second, the regulation had to "ad-
dress" matters that were indispensable attributes of state sover-
eignty.' 80 Third, state compliance with the regulation had to impair
directly the state's ability "to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions."' 181 Fourth, in relation to the
state interest, "the nature of the federal interest advanced ... [could
not] justif[y] state submission."' 182
In GarciaJustice Blackmun for the majority referred to the Hodel
test and the Court's unsuccessful efforts to apply it: he wrote, "What
has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution's
federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but
rather the nature and content of those limitations."' 18 3 Blackmun
went on to hold that the primary limitation on the exercise of the
commerce power is the structure of the legislative branch. Thus,
states will have to trust Congress to protect their interests in the
formulation of legislation. 18 4 Although Blackmun did not com-
pletely abandon the idea of affirmative limitations on the commerce
power, he did hold that the application of the federal wage and hour
legislation to a mass transit system did not violate whatever limita-
tion might exist. Thus, he concluded by quoting the late Justice Fe-
lix Frankfurter's statement that there may well be some "horribles"
which would produce a decision along the lines of the factually over-
ruled Usery. 185
Usery itself had overruled a fairly recent decision.' 86 In the
course of Usery's short but active life, the Court substantially diluted
its impact. For example, it sustained in Hodel an aggressive federal
program which overrode historically entrenched state power over
land use in the interest of controlling coal strip-mining.' 87 In Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,188 the Court upheld a fed-
eral program designed to channel state licensing of power plants.
And in the term before Garcia, the Court sustained the application of
federal age discrimination rules to game wardens employed by the
state of Wyoming. 189
179 Id. at 287.
180 Id. at 287-88.
181 Id. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
182 Id. at 288 n.29.
183 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
184 Id. at 552.
185 Id. at 556.
186 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
187 452 U.S. at 288 (district court decision that federal program violated tenth
amendment "rests on an unwarranted extension of ... National League of Cities").
188 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
189 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
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Like Pennhurst, Garcia produced several well-argued dissents.
Justice O'Connor suggested that while no "bright line"190 rule is
possible in a case like Usery, "state autonomy" should still count as a
"factor in the balance when interpreting the means by which Con-
gress can exercise its authority on the States as States."' 191 Justice
Powell's dissent favored a balancing approach like the fourth prong
of the Hodel test, in which the relative strengths of the federal and
state interests are compared.' 92
B. The Garcia Decision
There are several possible ways to view Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Garcia. He may have meant that although state sover-
eignty imposes affirmative limitations on the exercise of the com-
merce power, the Court is unable to articulate them. Another view,
no doubt supported by some of those who joined in the majority, is
that there is no limitation on the exercise of the commerce power
other than the federal political process.' 93
Most commentators, especially doctrinalists, would reject the
possibility of an inarticulable standard. Such a possibility calls to
mind the late Justice Potter Stewart's claim that he could not define
obscenity, but he could identify it.194 Yet, it may not be absurd to
state that the commerce power has limits for which it is difficult,
perhaps impossible, to articulate an enduring standard. The nature
of what is integral to a government has changed drastically since
1789 and will continue to change. Just as the Court had difficulty
distinguishing between an "integral" transit system and a
"nonintegral" intercity railway system, 195 so it will have difficulty
specifying what functions are so central or integral to a state govern-
ment that they define its sovereignty. And once the Court has made
such a categorization, time will ultimately strain some of its
specifications.
The positions ofJustices Powell, O'Connor, and Blackmun may
be presented in a form recognizable as "doctrine," but in each case
the doctrine's core is so spongy as to make the doctrinal formulation
worth very little. For example, Justice O'Connor's state autonomy
factor's weight would vary tremendously depending on a court's es-
timation of the federal interest's importance. Such a factor would
regularly lose out with a court dominated by people like Justice Mar-
190 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 578 (Powell, J., dissenting).
193 Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, promised a revival of Use y, presumably to
occur once the balance of power on the Court shifts again. Id. at 579-80.
194 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring.)
195 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
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shall, but would win often if the court were dominated by people
like Justice O'Connor. Justice Powell's balancing test leads in ex-
actly the same direction. By contrast, Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion promises somewhat greater repose than would the
O'Connor or Powell resolution.
C. The Expressive Element
Like Usery, Garcia has an expressive aspect. Usery stood for the
proposition that there are some limits to the commerce power in-
herent in the federal system; more generally, it emphasized that the
states and their instrumentalities count. Garcia's message is, at its
least coherent level, that courts should not bother with federalism
questions if Congress has designed an intricate regulatory statute
for some reason apart from federalism. Despite these expressive el-
ements, neither Usery nor Garcia lends itself to an enduring doctrinal
formulation. Revealingly, even the more conservative dissenters in
Garcia were unable to formulate with any precision a standard for
the future.
D. An Historical Approach
The significance of Garcia, like that of Bowsher and Pennhurst, is
primarily historical. As American society has grown and centralized,
the national government has faced increasing demands for solutions
to problems. In response, the Court has gradually demolished most
possible limits on the commerce power. The Court defined the
word "regulate" broadly.196 It dropped the nineteenth-century dis-
tinctions between navigation, commerce, manufacturing, mining,
and production-of which the last three were originally perceived as
not commerce.' 9 7 The Court further broadened the commerce
power by holding that Congress could undertake commerce regula-
tion for any end not contradicted by an affirmative textual constitu-
tional provision other than the ninth and tenth amendments.' 9 8
196 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (upholding federal
coastal licenses to operate in New York waters and striking down New York laws which
created steamboat monopoly).
197 Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)
("Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Con-
gress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.") with Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("[N]one of [the] essential antecedents of production
constitutes a transaction in or forms any part of interstate commerce" and is therefore
not subject to federal regulation.).
198 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (confirming Con-
gress's power to regulate against racial discrimination where Congress found such dis-
crimination has "a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce").
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Thus, Congress could ban lottery tickets because they were morally
reprehensible, not because they damaged or impeded some eco-
nomic interest. 199 Finally, the Court held that federal regulation of
commerce could extend to things or actions not themselves in com-
merce, but which might, when aggregated with the things or actions
of others similarly situated, "affect" commerce.200 As social pres-
sure has mounted, the Court has poured into the commerce clause a
jurisprudence which reflects a fundamental alteration in the Consti-
tution's allocation of governmental powers.
However, the holding of Pennhurst indicates that Garcia does not
amount to the complete interment of states' authority. Courts still
might, and in the former case the Supreme Court did, recognize the
substantiality of the states' interest in handling nonfederal legal
questions not involving direct exercises of an enumerated federal
power. This possibility might seem insignificant when compared
with both the frequency and significance of Congress's use of the
commerce power, but developments in other areas of federalism in-
dicate that it is not.
In recent cases the Court has reaffirmed its desire to avoid in-
validating state law under the supremacy clause, even when a state
and the federal government both exercise their respective powers to
regulate essentially the same thing. For instance, in a tortured opin-
ion Justice White upheld a California moratorium on building nu-
clear power plants20 ' in the face of elaborate federal statutory and
administrative regulation of that industry. The Court has also de-
clined to strike down state laws which burden interstate commerce
so long as they serve a "legitimate" local purpose.20 2 At the same
199 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
200 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
("[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to
regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the states of origin
and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce
.... Congress may... prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, how-
ever 'local' their operations may appear."); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942) ("That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by
itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here,
his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.").
201 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); see also Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (Washington law regulating oil tankers
partially validated, partially invalidated). But see Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v.
State Oil & Gas Bd., 106 S. Ct. 709 (1986) (Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board's au-
thority pre-empted by federal regulation.).
202 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986) (upholding state restriction on
imports of bait fish). The Court described the applicable standard as whether a state
"needlessly obstruct[s] interstate trade or attempt[s] to 'place itself in a position of eco-
nomic isolation.'" Id. at 2455 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527
(1935)).
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time that the Court has avoided finding federal-state collisions, it
has invalidated state laws discriminating against nonresidents. 20 3
Such decisions are not inconsistent with a limited recognition of
federalism, for they involve a question of the power of the states
among themselves and entail no exertion of national governmental
power.
Thus, Garcia more clearly than Bowsher or Pennhurst shows the
social order imposing its will on the legal system. I have suggested
that a generalized, historical, and strongly ingrained fear of concen-
trations of power supported questionable interpretations of the gen-
eral notion of separation of powers in Bowsher and of the eleventh
amendment in Pennhurst, yet the Garcia Court subordinated that fear
in sustaining an exercise of the most powerful legal tool, a federal
enumerated power.
IV
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF AN
HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION
A. The Meaning of an Historical Constitution
The Supreme Court failed to articulate meaningful doctrinal
formulations of enduring significance in Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Gar-
ica. This failure is not the result of judicial inadequacy or some
other temporary circumstance, nor does it lend support to claims
that law is radically or even significantly indeterminate at all times.
Rather, these cases demonstrate that the development of case law
arising under the United States Constitution can only be under-
stood in its historical context.
To conclude that the United States Constitution and the legal
rules it creates are an historical constitution is not novel20 4 and may
not appear to have much content. The idea certainly does not, in
the abstract, offer much specific guidance about what the future
holds. And it suggests that past results will frequently be explained
in terms of their non-legal contexts, which are subject to perpetual
revisions, rearrangements, and changes in historical fashion.
There are, of course, various forms or types of historical analy-
203 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (state statute
taxing out-of-state insurance companies at higher rate held invalid); United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (municipal ordinance
limiting employment subject to the privileges and immunities clause). The Court has
continued to apply vigorously explicit federal statutory preemptions of state law, as in
the case of the federal pension law. See, e.g., Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp.,
463 U.S. 1220 (1983), aff'g mer., Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F. 2d 323,
329 (2d Cir. 1982) (state statute relating to employee benefit plan as defined by ERISA
preempted by federal statute).
204 See generally C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1937).
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sis.2 ° 5 Some definition of the phrase "historical constitution" is
therefore necessary. By the term "historical constitution" I do not
mean that the original intention or understanding of a particular
provision in the Constitution ought necessarily (or even usually) to
control in constitutional law: indeed, I mean something almost the
opposite. 20 6
The historical theory of the Constitution places the evolution of
the Constitution in the context of the development of American so-
ciety20 7 and in a larger framework of social theory. The Constitu-
tion of 1787 established the fundamental, governmental structures
of a group of societies that wished to form a nation. It established a
national governmental structure and specified certain rights, pow-
ers, and obligations of the states and of the federal government and
its components and citizens.
The Constitution of 1787 is now a small element of what has
become a very large national community with a number of signifi-
cant regional subcommunities. This national community functions
primarily in response to the will of its constituency and certain ex-
ternal stimuli, 208 and not in response to abstract constitutional or
other legal commands.
Our society continues to be dynamic, but this dynamism is
neither new nor materially more frenetic than it was, for example,
from 1830-1870. Some periods may experience greater change or
stability than others, but close historical study of even the most se-
rene epochs reveals change and tension as well as continuity and
consensus.
20 9
205 Examples are Marxist history, intellectual history, and history which focuses on
great men.
206 See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985) (arguing that the Framers did not intend "the original understanding at Philadel-
phia" to be dispositive of constitutional inquiries.).
207 I would even go so far as to endorse an expanded version of the thesis offered
here to the effect that in the United States the interpretation and operation of most
indigenous legal subsystems replicates a substance-oriented, common-law system even if
the core of the subsystem is a statute or a constitution. (I think this observation is less
likely to be true of highly volatile statutes like the Internal Revenue Code than, for ex-
ample, the U.C.C.) In such common law systems I believe that the crucial historical fact
has been the freedom, rather than the constraint, imposed by the operation of preceden-
tial "doctrine." Precedent may actually liberatejudges by focusing not on issues of legal
formality but rather on the limits and continuing vitality of a non-canonical rule. See
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). For an interesting comparative treat-
ment of aspects of this question, see P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY,
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987).
208 Much has been written about the accuracy of various ideological and philosophic
perspectives in both the interpretation and use of history. In this essay I have attempted
to avoid this debate, although my views on this issue are fairly obvious.
209 See, e.g., Dyer, Changes in the Link Between Families and Land in the 1Vest Midlands in the
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The relative insignificance of the Constitution and the fact of
perpetual change in the underlying social order constantly gener-
ates new questions, new aspirations, new conflicts, and new inter-
pretations of old institutions and old language. Many of these
developments arise directly or obliquely from consideration of con-
stitutional issues.
The fact that change is pervasive both in society and in the sub-
stance of its law does not necessarily mean that the constitutional
text will be completely or substantially disregarded in the course of
history. One value which a society may embrace is a reverence for
the constitutional text. But even with such a commitment, constitu-
tions frequently employ language, phrases like "cruel and unusual"
punishment2 10 and "due process of law,21' which not only do not
inhibit but invite constant societal reevaluation. More significantly,
language frequently lacks the precision to hold off over time insis-
tent social demands, even assuming a commitment to the constitu-
tional canon.
In the end, however, constitutions and law cannot long con-
strain societies. Rather, each society has considerable freedom in its
internal, dynamic, historical evolution to redefine basic parts of its
constitution. This is particularly true if, as just suggested, the text
uses open-ended phrases or concepts, omits specification of implied
provisions, or employs very general and grandiose formulations.
Thus, instability and change have been noteworthy elements in the
legal development of the unspecified powers of the states2 12 and
now the general rubrics enjoining separation of governmental
functions.
Some 2 13 will decry this uncertainty or instability in the core
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, in LAND, KINSHIP, AND LIFE-CYcLE 305 (R. Smith ed.
1984).
210 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
211 Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to terminate pregnancy within
right to privacy) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (broadly defining due pro-
cess liberty interests to include right to exercise discretion about one's children's educa-
tion, thus constraining states' regulation of such family matters) and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (bringing right to contract freely within scope of liberty inter-
est, thus constraining states' passage of labor legislation) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (homosexuals' right to engage in sodomy not fundamental) and Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (optician's right to do business does not
prevent broadly restrictive regulation of opticians).
212 Compare Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (Nebraska's
regulation of interstate ground water use violative of commerce clause) with Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (California's regulation of
nuclear power plants not pre-empted by Atomic Energy Act and thus not a violation of
due process clause).
213 Herbert Wechsler, for example, obviously disapproves of this kind of approach.
Other commentators have endorsed a theory of constitutional interpretation which I
would call a common-law type theory that is not markedly different from the theory of an
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meanings of basic provisions of the Constitution. They misconstrue
the availability of alternatives: any constitution or interpretation of a
constitution which attempts to confine the greater part of such a
document or set of ideas about the structure of government will fail
as soon as the underlying social order moves, in its own ways, to
reject its confines.
B. Judicial Decisions Under an Historical Constitution Theory
While acknowledging that the Constitution ought to be viewed
primarily as an historical document, many will wonder what signifi-
cance that conclusion should have for judges and for others con-
cerned with particular cases. It is easier to state what judges should
not do than to specify exactly how they should proceed. Generally,
judges who understand the historical character of the Constitution
should not attempt to confine their study of particular provisions to
ascertaining what was originally intended or how it operated at a
particular time.
More specifically, the notion of an historical constitution sug-
gests the following guidelines. First, judges who accept the Consti-
tution as primarily an historically contingent source of law should
recognize the legitimacy and inevitability of alterations in former
constitutional certainties. Thus, precedent,21 4 especially when it in-
volves general constitutional prescriptions, should not be under-
stood as firm doctrine, but as an expression of law in one context.21 5
While precedent should not lightly be tossed away, its continuing
persuasiveness hinges on its larger, historical context. Thus, in Bow-
sher both courts properly minimized the underpinnings of the
Humphrey's Executor decision. 216 Conversely, the very stringent
framework erected in Korematsu v. United States2 1 7 to evaluate suspect
racial classifications seems particularly reliable. Korematsu con-
fronted a powerful social demand for a decision that would mini-
mize the importance of the claims of American citizens ofJapanese
ancestry.
Second, the American judicial system's unique contribution to
jurisprudence has been to encourage judges to decide cases having
a substantial "political" component or presenting difficult funda-
mental questions. While judges should occasionally employ pru-
historical constitution. See, e.g., Wellington, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1983)
(reviewing M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)).
214 See supra note 207.
215 The district court recognized this to some extent in Synar. See 626 F. Supp. at
1384 (discussing decline of the delegation doctrine which accompanied rise of adminis-
trative law).
216 Id. at 1399; Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188.
217 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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dential devices to avoid a decision,218 the American judicial system
should continue to decide a broad range of political and "funda-
mental" cases. In deciding such cases judges should focus on the
democratic nature of American government and law and on the so-
cietal values at issue. In general, judicial resolution of questions
should foster further societal development with respect to the con-
cerns in dispute. Decisions like Lochner v. New York 21 9 and Roe v.
Wade220 (discussed below) are, in the absence of a social consen-
sus, 22 ' mistaken, whereas decisions imposing or specifying proce-
dural mechanisms to ensure fair legislative or judicial consideration
of issues are valid.222
Third, judges may decide cases which involve consideration of
deeply ingrained social attitudes or prejudices. We accept the result
in Brown v. Board of Education223 not because there was a social con-
sensus in favor of integration, but because there was a consensus,
and long judicial preparation, 224 supporting the conclusion that sep-
218 For example, Indiana's pro-Republican party legislative gerrymandering which
did not disable any identifiable group needing protection under the equal protection
clause presents a political question in two senses. See Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct.
2797 (1986).
219 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
220 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see infra text accompanying notes 250-53.
221 When one suggests that legal rules are determined at least to some extent by a
nonformal process of social consensus, people immediately think that one is arguing
that law is or should be determined by a Gallup poll or some other simple-minded and
evanescent indication of majoritarian sentiment. This critical and pejoritive picture is
based on several incorrect assumptions. First, a society's polity need not be majoritarian
at all. Second, the results of some instant measurement of sentiment are, even if accu-
rate, rarely transferable and should be resisted by judges considering appropriate legal
rules. Third, the legislative process is designed to handle most social demands and an
historically sensitive judge will look to it to resolve most social questions.
222 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (mandating procedure to ensure
defendant is not deprived of fifth amendment right against self-incrimination). I am
aware that many, including perhaps some current justices of the Supreme Court (e.g.,
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) (recognizing narrow
"public" safety exception to Miranda); Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986)
(O'Connor, J.) (individual held in custody and given Miranda warning need not be in-
formed of an outside telephone call relating that attorney had been hired)) and some
who have read versions of this article, find it difficult to distinguish Miranda's elaborate,
quasi-legislative specification of procedures to be applied to individuals held in custody
from the similarly elaborate and quasi-legislative specifications of privacy rights in Roe's
pregnancy situation. It is argued that the Constitution provides little or no basis for
either.
I would agree that no consensus supports the particular format of procedures estab-
lished by Miranda, but I believe that that decision is much more easily sustained by most
theories of the role of the text and also by a wide-ranging social consensus supporting
the desirability of protecting individuals in police custody but not yet charged with a
crime.
223 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
224 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (requirement of
segregated seats in a mixed race law school held to violate equal protection clause);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (separate law school for blacks in Texas held not
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arate schools were unfair. There is still no consensus, however,
about how to remedy the multiple problems of deprivations which
blacks have experienced: the deeply divergent economic and, in cer-
tain cases, cultural situations of blacks and others hinders such a
consensus.225 Not surprisingly, there is also no social consensus
supporting aggressive affirmative action programs. The courts have,
in effect, recognized this vacuum: the mere occurrence of unequal
results in employment or other facets of life does not automatically
trigger the requirement of remedial action,226 but the development
and implementation of an affirmative action program in such a case
pursuant to civil rights legislation 227 or private agreement 228 is not
prohibited.
Fourth, courts generally should avoid hasty decision of impor-
tant cases. The expedited appeal procedure in cases in which a fed-
eral statute has been held unconstitutional 229 has considerable
to be equal to white law school; black student ordered admitted under equal protection
clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of racially re-
strictive covenants constitutes state action which violates equal protection clause);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (black woman cannot be deprived of
legal education available to equally qualified whites); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938) (failure to provide any instate legal education for blacks violates
equal protection clause when it is available to whites); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917) (city ordinance prohibiting mixed-race blocks violative of due process); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (exclusion of nonwhites from grand jury venire
panels violates equal protection clause).
225 Thus, I think that the federal courts should avoid elaborate remedial specifica-
tions in decrees in cases of racial discrimination. Rather, they should employ simple,
but drastic, remedies like ordering the schools closed until the parties can reach a settle-
ment about a remedial order. This might mean that residential segregation would not be
immediately remedied by busing orders because black litigants might accept resource
reallocations to predominantly black neighborhood schools. In hindsight, this remedy
might have been more efficacious than busing orders. In such cases it is also possible
that no settlement can ever be devised among the parties.
The reliance on busing and other strategies designed to produce a quick balance of
the available races in all schools may have led to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974), which essentially leaves blacks remediless if the segregated schools exist across
municipal boundaries not drawn in a racially discriminatory manner. If local agreement
had created the primary remedies, then the Milliken plaintiffs might have won their case
with the State of Michigan and have negotiated special state remedial assistance for the
Detroit school system.
226 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (police test with disproportionate
racial impact not unconstitutional because test is directly related to job requirements).
227 See Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.
Ct. 3063 (1986) (consent decree may be entered to benefit minority firefighters who
were not actual victims of employer's discrimination); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (fund order and membership
goal designed to benefit minority sheet metal workers constitutional although it would
benefit some minorities not directly harmed).
228 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (master collective
bargaining agreement with affirmative action plan allowing preferential treatment of mi-
nority trainees not prohibited by Civil Rights Act).
229 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).
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appeal. It promises a speedy resolution of an important matter
which, if delayed, might create serious problems in operating or in
disentangling the operation of the government. But speed should
be sacrificed when it imposes significant costs through poor results.
While the district court produced a solid opinion in Synar, the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court should have taken more time to observe
the reaction to that decision and to review its reasoning carefully
before rushing to a conclusion. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Bowsher, like his opinion in the expedited case of United States v.
Nixon,230 reflects hasty, superficial thinking and composition.
Fifth, a prerequisite to judicial behavior consistent with an his-
torical conception of the Constitution is careful rehearsal of the
background of each case and of its most relevant precedents.
Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court decision reflects
an appreciation of the implications of their attempts to draw a line
based on separation of powers in the sand of governmental practice.
If Congress cannot participate in the removal of a purportedly exec-
utive official, then it is hard to explain why Congress may legislate
sweeping limitations on the President's power to remove such an
official. Similarly, if independent agencies perform legislative or
quasi-legislative functions and executive branch officials perform
functions within the scope of the judicial power of the United States,
then one looks in vain to find a textual basis-or even a basis in
some partial separations-of-powers theory-to explain why a pre-
sumably legislative official may not perform certain executive
branch functions.
A judge who recognizes the historical nature of the Constitu-
tion will confront two major difficulties. First, general aspirational
values recognized in the Constitution (for instance, that people
should be treated equally) may in some cases conflict with an over-
whelming social consensus favoring a specific social practice or rule
(for example, one which does not reflect equal treatment). Second,
the viewpoint of an enlightened or elite segment of the population
(for instance, that the death penalty is cruel) may diverge from a
broad social consensus (for example, that the death penalty may be
an appropriate sanction for heinous crimes). 23 ' Although these two
situations cannot be completely separated, I would argue that the
judge is not free in a democratic society to act solely on some view
of what an elite segment wishes, but he may and should act if, in
considering the general aspirational goal against the enduring social
practice, he thinks that the court's decision might move society to
230 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
231 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating death penalties in
this case without a majority opinion).
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accept an expanded conception of equality or due process. Thus,
judges may lead society in some limited situations. 232
C. An Historical Constitution and the Protection of Rights
An historical theory of the Constitution may be thought of as a
threat to the Constitution's role in erecting "rights" or other barri-
ers to government action which protect the weak or the oppressed.
Some will no doubt fear that judges who accept such a theory of the
Constitution will be particularly prone to defer to the legislative will
or some other demand 233 of the social order that might hurt a mi-
nority group or a particular individual. It is not enough to respond
that a theory of "rights", even when held by judges who are doc-
trinalists, has not always protected unpopular minorities 234 or
individuals.235
There are several responses to criticisms of the historical ap-
proach based on fears of discrimination against minorities or indi-
viduals. First, the social evolution which produces new substance in
constitutional relations also may produce new demands for protec-
tions, like the demands allegedly protected by static conceptions of
232 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (different standards for confer-
ral of dependant status upon spouses of military women than spouses of military men in
minority violates due process); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (making right to vote in any manner contingent on wealth violates equal protec-
tion clause).
Some who have read this article have identified the assertion that judges may occa-
sionally lead society as both fatal and contrary to the main thesis. I could hide behind a
claim that leading is frequently inadvertent. For instance, in many situations judges face
considerable uncertainty and very mixed demands from a society. In other situations,
judges confront very vocal demands from a small segment of society and have little evi-
dence of a social consensus one way or another.
But I am admitting to more than the difficulty of ascertaining and following a con-
sensus: I am suggesting that judges can occasionally push an ambivalent or reluctant
social order. I will have to save for another article a fuller articulation of this possibility,
but because the explanation offered is based on observation and is primarily descriptive,
it would be inaccurate for me not to admit that leading can take place and can be
successful.
233 The classic popular example of this is, of course, acute public pressure to indict,
convict, and execute people allegedly responsible for heinous crimes. But part of the
historical constitution is that judges should be aware of and resistant to sudden, emo-
tional demands for a particular judicial or legal result. Although a theory of an historical
Constitution accepts the notion that a Constitution is ultimately an instrument of social,
popular will, there is frequently a major difference between what societies seem to de-
mand in panicked circumstances and what they demand over time.
234 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (World War II internment
ofJapanese-Americans held constitutional).
235 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding convictions for
sedition on grounds that circulars which advocated supporting Russian Revolution by
refusing to work in munitions factories necessarily interfered with war effort against
Germany); Polenberg, Progressivism and Anarchism: Judge Henry D. Clayton and the Abrams
Trial, 3 LAw & HIST. REv. 397 (1985).
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"rights." Therefore, doctrinalists should recognize that theories
which encourage legal rigidity may often discourage a widening of
constitutional protections.23 6 Just as "rights" doctrinalists point to
Brown v. Board of Education,23 7 they ignore Plessy v. Ferguson,238 Loch-
ner v. New York, 239 and Bowers v. Hardwick.240 Doctrine, if articulable,
cannot be both rigidly protective and flexibly inclusive at the same
time.
Second, an historical view of the Constitution frequently does
result in the protection of "rights" claims asserted by minorities or
individuals. Read Robert Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United
States,24 1 the first Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,242 and
Felix Frankfurter's opinion in Rochin v. California.243 Eachjudge and
his opinion reflected a belief in the historical evolution of the pro-
tection of the individual from the exercise of government authority.
Ultimately, however, one must concede that an historical ap-
proach does defer in a democratic polity considerably to popular
will, particularly to a formal legislative expression of such will. The
conviction that a wide spectrum of people in a society should have
laws and rules that reflect their beliefs and actions forms the core of
an historical theory of constitutionalism if the particular society's
polity is democratic.244
Jesse Choper has expressed a preference for judicial considera-
tion of "rights" claims: Choper's work relies on the notion that
"rights" claims involve "principles" whereas governmental powers
cases involve only "allocations" of permissible powers.2 45 But pow-
ers impinge on claims for freedom or protection, and allocation de-
236 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing against expansion of due process property interests to include statutory entitle-
ments); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)
(BlackJ, dissenting) (arguing against extension of right to free speech to cover wearing
of political symbols at school); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
670 (1966) (BlackJ, dissenting) (arguing against striking down Virginia poll tax); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that fourth amend-
ment alone does not bar admission of illegally seized evidence).
237 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
238 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute providing for racial separation
in railway cars).
239 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding New York statute limiting total number of employee
working hours unconstitutional).
240 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (refusing to strike down Georgia criminal law against
sodomy on privacy grounds).
241 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (JacksonJ., dissenting).
242 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
243 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
244 To admit that this is inevitable and proper is also a canon of doctrinalism. The
degree of openness with which new questions are faced or old ones reconsidered as a
result of social change is all that separates the two positions.
245 See sources cited supra note 23.
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cisions can significantly curtail or recognize such claims. For
example, on the surface, Dred Scott v. Sandford246 involved ajurisdic-
tional question: whether a slave, or an alleged former slave, was a
citizen entitled to sue in federal court under article III. At a deeper
level, it involved a freedom claim: Dred Scott claimed that he was
free or that, in any event, he could sue to establish his freedom. 247
Finally, it involved a pure allocation of powers question: whether
Congress could prohibit or limit slavery in territories not yet organ-
ized as states.248
An historical view of the Constitution does not distinguish a pri-
ori between individual claims for freedom and protection on the one
hand and allocations of power questions on the other. Indeed, the
history of constitutional development suggests that the two types of
questions are rarely distinct. Even when a case appears superficially
to be purely of one type, the future ramifications of a decision can-
not be confined to one or the other realm. For instance, in the late
nineteenth century the Supreme Court decided a line of cases in
which the "rights" claims of resident Chinese aliens generally disap-
peared in resolving cases in favor of Congress's authority in exercis-
ing the naturalization power to abrogate treaties with the Chinese
Empire.249
D. An Historical Constitution and the Privacy Cases
Some might take the foregoing description of an historical ap-
proach to constitutional law to mean that a decision which reflects
the popular consensus is in and of itself valid. For example, some
might think I would say that Roe v. Wade250 is valid because the ma-
jority of Americans clearly support privacy in abortion matters; for
this reason Roe may never be completely overruled.
The Roe decision is not consistent with the theory of an histori-
cal constitution. The notion of an historical constitution rests upon
the theory that the social order continually defines the most funda-
mental aspects of the Constitution and of all law. One very impor-
tant ingredient of that definition is society's power to condemn
certain actions based on moral values, even if those values are not
universally shared. I suspect that while the great majority of the
American people do not find abortion always immoral, many find it
immoral in some instances and believe that only individuals elected
by, and accountable to, the people should decide what is con-
246 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
247 Id. at 403.
248 Id. at 432.
249 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
250 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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demned. Thus, if Massachusetts wishes to ban abortion it should be
able to do so, except in the case of a clear threat to maternal life.
Conversely, if California wishes to allow abortion permissively it
should. An historical Constitution in a democratic society cannot al-
low judges to make basic moral judgments on fundamental issues
absent a clear consensus and some basis in the text supporting the
decision. Not surprisingly, then, dismay and doctrinal confusion
abound when the Supreme Court attempts to decide questions like
whether a state can impose a twenty-four hour waiting period before
an abortion may take place.251
The theory of an historical constitution sees abortion as a ques-
tion of deep social attitudes which, at least until an overwhelming
social consensus emerges, should be decided by state legislatures
rather than by a judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
that awards all rights to the fetus or to the prospective mother dur-
ing the first trimester.
Roe or the dissent's position in Bowers v. Hardwick 252 could be
consistent with a theory of historical constitutionalism if they had
been decided on a basis other than the protection of abstract privacy
notions. If the Court had premised either Roe or Bowers on the fact
that enforcement of the abortion or sodomy prohibitions was either
nonexistent or so selective as to be freakish, 253 then state legislators
could have prevailed either by ensuring enforcement or by re-
fraining from enacting them. Such a resolution of these cases would
have had the salutary effect of putting the pressure for a resolution
of such claims on the legislatures, where it appropriately resides.
E. Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Garcia Under an Historical
Constitution Theory
None of the three cases discussed here present fundamental
questions of social morality as clearly as does Roe. On the surface,
Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Garcia each involved a seemingly minute
question about the propriety of certain rules of intra- or inter-gov-
ernmental behavior in a federal system with a tripartite national
government.
Garcia is probably the easiest case to reconcile with an historical
251 See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983). It is interesting, of course, to turn the abortion cases on their doctrinal heads
and ask whether a fetus should be considered a person and, if so, whether its rights are
protected. If a fetus is a person, then the logic of "rights" doctrinalism leaves the preg-
nant woman powerless.
252 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
253 Although freakish enforcement has never led the Supreme Court to strike down
a criminal statute, Justice Potter Stewart suggested that it should. See Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 388 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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constitution theory. Given the tremendous expansion of the realm
of interstate commerce and the generality of the word "regulate" in
the commerce clause, state sovereignty cannot limit the exercise of
the commerce power, even assuming continued adherence to a fed-
eral system. Twentieth-century conditions have led increasingly to
national efforts to solve problems and confirm the impossibility of
finding in the abstraction of the states' sovereignty any substantial
limitation on a direct exercise of the federal commerce power.
Pennhurst is the hardest to reconcile of the three cases. The
scope of pendent jurisdiction and its existence in the shadowy world
of state sovereignty under the eleventh amendment are the most ar-
cane of the issues raised. Pennhurst shows that although state sover-
eignty must yield to direct exercises of a federal enumerated power,
the sovereignty of the states and their role in the federal union will
be recognized and preserved in other situations. 254
Bowsher, like Pennhurst, presents initially an arcane question, but
like Garcia, it involves the fundamental structural issue of the separa-
tion of powers. The most enduring and socially appealing feature of
the separation-of-powers idea, at least in the American context, is
that judges should be autonomous and that their power should be
protected from political encroachment. 255 Northern Pipeline should,
therefore, prove durable.
In the administrative law context, where executive officials and
legislative functions are mixed, the social commitment to the ab-
straction of separated powers is not discernible, except insofar as it
reflects a general commitment to the idea of a diffusion of power.
Thus, Bowsher and Chadha probably reflect judicial fear of the threat
of Congressional domination, or at least aggression, within the fed-
eral government. This fear is certainly greater now than at the time
of Humphrey's Executor.
Thus, historical developments and very general attitudes in so-
ciety explain Garcia and Bowsher. To some extent, however, the two
explanations conflict. It would seem more reasonable for conserva-
tive judges to fear (and, therefore, to attempt to contain) expansive
federal power over state governments than Congress's few efforts to
control more precisely governmental functioning.
Developments under an historical constitution reflect not pri-
marily the predilections of conservative judges but the demands of
the underlying social order. American society has demanded laws
and programs from the federal government, ranging from farm sup-
254 Recall that Pennhurst may also be a disguised effort to further curtail the dockets
of the federal courts. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
255 See Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to an Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 201 (1984).
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ports to health care for the elderly, that would be struck down or
limited ifjudges were to respond solely to a political abstraction like
the fear of central governmental power. Indeed, the ultimate expla-
nation for Bowsher may be the Court's realization of its inability over
time to prevent federal government centralization. Given this result,
a revival of the desire for federal separation of powers was as inevi-
table as efforts by Congress to assert itself more forcefully in the
wonderland of federal benefits and programs.
If courts truly cannot resist the pressures for centralization, but
at the same time continue to reflect a social commitment to diffusion
of power, then Bowsher should have two contradictory consequences.
On the one hand, future judicial decisions will not alter significantly
the theoretically unclear role and power of independent commis-
sions and agencies in the federal government; on the other hand,
the Court will continue to look for ways to confine formally the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches' respective spheres of operation,
particularly if one branch is perceived as seeking to change settled
practice.
Some, as they finish this essay, will think that I have allowed my
sense of the "is" in legal matters to defeat my sense, or Herbert
Wechsler's sense, of the "ought to be." They will feel that I have not
met Wechsler and others on the same plane, that is, I have not ad-
dressed what law is and how it ought to operate.
But in the case of law, the "ought to be" for which Wechsler
and others have argued is so hopelessly inadequate, even in basic
and fundamental areas, that it must be revised or treated as a myth.
The only revision which can face the "is" of our legal system is one
which accepts law as an organic feature of social organization and
which encourages the courts to recognize frankly their role-both
its possibilities and its limitations.
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